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Philosophy and T heology
After the Second World War, eugenics earned a nearly universal bad name, but 
recent ethicists have sought to rehabilitate eugenics in a nonracist, nontotalitarian 
form. Do we have a duty to choose children that have genetic endowments that 
predispose them to have the best life? Julian Savulescu is perhaps the most articu­
late and prolific defender of an affirmative answer. With Guy Kahane, Savulescu 
defines the principle of procreative beneficence (PB) as follows: “If couples (or single 
reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, then they have a 
significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could have, 
whose life can be expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go best or 
at least not worse than any of the others” (“The Moral Obligation to Create Children 
with the Best Chance of the Best Life,” Bioethics, June 2009).
Although in the future, it may be possible to use sperm sorting to accomplish 
PB prior to conception, PB can now be accomplished in two ways, either by use 
of prenatal testing during pregnancy (amniocentesis, ultrasound, etc.) followed by 
abortion of the children deemed unacceptable, or by use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). In this essay, I will not be focusing 
on abortion for eugenic purposes1 but rather on the second form of PB, making use 
of IVF and PGD.
Savulescu and Kahane support PB by appeal to a more general principle that 
to make ethically good procreative choices, parents must consider the prospective 
well-being of the potential child. “When we make decisions, the option we should 
choose is the one which maximizes expected value. In the case of selection and 
reproductive decision making, the outcome of interest should be how well a new 
person’s whole life goes, that is, well-being. PB thus states that we have reason to 
select the child who is expected to have the most advantaged life.” On this view, we
1 I discuss such cases elsewhere. See Janet E. Smith and Christopher Kaczor, Life 
Issues, Medical Choices (Cincinnati, OH: Servant Books, 2007), 46-48.
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should accept PB because of the more general obligation of parents to maximize the 
chances that their child will have a good life.
Do advocates for PB, including Savulescu and Kahane, accept the full implica­
tions of this general principle? Do they consistently apply it in evaluating reproductive 
choices? Indeed, upon consideration it turns out that this more general principle—that 
potential parents should procreate with the greatest expected well-being of their 
possible children in mind—leads to the rejection of PB.
First, there is evidence to suggest that the use of IVF itself increases the likeli­
hood that a child will have serious birth defects. One study “suggests that children 
born by IVF have an increased risk of developing cerebral problems, in particular 
cerebral paralysis.”2 Another study concludes, “Children conceived with the use of 
intracytoplasmic sperm injection . . . or IVF run a double risk of presenting a greater 
defect at birth in relation to the general population.”3 Other researchers found that 
“8.6 percent of children born by IVF had greater defects at birth, double that of the 
control group.”4 The Centers for Disease Control report that birth defects, including 
heart wall problems, may be two to four times more likely for children conceived 
through assisted reproductive technology than for children conceived naturally.5 The 
long-term epigenetic risks of IVF are simply not yet known.
Of course, any given child conceived by IVF may be free from such birth 
defects, and thankfully most of them are. However, the general principle justify­
ing PB is that parents should choose for their potential children the life that would 
maximize well-being, taking into account the likelihood involved. Since IVF itself 
does not maximize likely well-being, the general principle justifying PB leads to a 
rejection of IVF and therefore also a rejection of PB insofar as it involves IVF.
Even if using IVF did not increase the likelihood of disability, the principle that 
prospective parents should maximize the expected value for their potential children 
is also not consistently applied by Savulescu and Kahane, since they also hold that 
“if couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child . . . , then they have a 
significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could have, 
whose life can be expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go best 
or at least not worse than any of the others” (emphasis added).
If we have a moral obligation to maximize the chances of children having a good 
life, procreation and child rearing should take place only within marriage. Children
2 B. Stromberg et al., “Neurological Sequelae in Children Born after In-Vitro 
Fertilization: A Population-Based Study,” Lancet 359. 9305 (February 9, 2002): 461-465.
3 M. Hansen et al., “The Risk of Major Birth Defects after Intracytoplasmic Sperm 
Injection and In Vitro Fertilization,” New England Journal o f  Medicine 346.10 (March 7, 
2002): 725-730.
4G. Koren, “Adverse Effects of Assisted Reproductive Technology and Pregnancy 
Outcome,” Pediatric Research 52.2 (August 2002): 136.
5 Miranda Hitti, “CDC: IVF May Boost Birth Defect Risk,” WebMD Health News, 
November 18, 2008, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/583728.
592
N otes &  A bstracts
conceived and raised by married parents—rather than single parents, cohabiting 
parents, or divorced parents—have lower rates of poverty, better relationships with 
their own parents, better physical health, greater success in school, lower rates of 
mental illness and psychological distress, lower rates of substance abuse, less trouble 
with the law, lower rates of being abused physically or sexually, lower rates of teen 
pregnancy, higher stability in their own intimate relationships as adults, and lower 
likelihood of death by accident, addiction, or suicide.6
So the general principle that parents should give their children the best chance 
at the best life also implies that parents have a moral obligation to conceive and raise 
children only within marriage. If we have a moral obligation to maximize the likely 
well-being of children, then this reproductive moral obligation excludes single repro­
ducers as well as cohabiting couples from reproducing, since children reproduced 
and raised in these circumstances have significantly less expected well-being than 
those reproduced and raised by a married mother and father. If advocates of PB are 
not willing to endorse the moral obligation of marriage as a prerequisite for ethically 
acceptable procreation, then they need to find a new general principle to justify PB. 
If “reproductive autonomy” (itself not a morally unproblematic concept) overrides 
the obligation to procreate and rear children only in marriage, then “reproductive 
autonomy” should also override PB generally.
Ultimately, Savulescu and Kahane justify the duty to maximize the likely 
well-being of children on the basis of a consequentialist first principle: “When we 
make decisions, the option we should choose is the one which maximizes expected 
value.” A consistent application ofthis principle also leads to a rejection of PB, since 
the expected value of using money for PB is simply not on a par with the expected 
value of using those same funds to alleviate poverty.
At least three factors are relevant in a consequentialism of expected value—the 
relative importance of the goods one must choose between, the number of people 
who will benefit, and the likelihood of the benefit. On each score, consistent conse- 
quentialists ought to choose alleviation of poverty ahead of PB. First, consider the 
significance of the goods involved. Given a choice between, on the one hand, being 
deprived of the goods that procreative beneficence may deliver (such as greater 
intelligence) and, on the other hand, being deprived of basic necessities (such as 
food, shelter, and basic medical care), virtually no one would choose to be without 
the basic necessities. The value of not dying in pain outweighs the value of having 
greater intelligence. So developing and deploying procreative beneficence is simply 
not morally on a par with helping prevent suffering and death from lack of food, 
shelter, and basic medical care.
Second, the number of people who would benefit is also relevant. If the benefits 
are equal, benefiting more people takes precedence over benefiting fewer people. 
Likewise, benefiting actual people takes precedence over benefiting potential people
6 W. Bradford Wilcox et al., Why Marriage Matters: Twenty-Six Conclusions from  
the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York: Institute for American Values, 2005), 12, 14, 19, 
22- 24, 27, 29, 31.
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(Savulescu and Kahane’s view of human embryos). Savulescu and Kahane endorse 
this principle: “As means of selection become safer and our ability to use them to 
select non-disease characteristics increases, we believe that PB will require most 
reproducers to select the most advantaged child unless doing so is predicted to lead 
to a very significant loss o f well-being to existing people” (emphasis added). But 
this is precisely the situation in which we currently and for the foreseeable future 
find ourselves. The financial resources used to achieve PB to benefit only one or 
two children could instead be used to benefit many more people living in poverty. 
The costs of IVF and PGD are high, averaging from $12,500 to $16,000 per cycle.7 
If, instead of spending this money to promote the well-being of one or two babies 
brought to live birth by IVF and PGD, the money were used to supply safe water, 
mosquito nets, and healthy food for people suffering in poverty, then the well-being 
of a greater number of people would be enhanced.
To avoid this conclusion, one might appeal to the distinction between intention­
ally causing some effect and simply allowing it to occur. Parents acting in accordance 
with PB are not setting out to harm those in poverty which they foresee will happen 
as an unfortunate side-effect of their spending money on PB.
However, according to this consequentialist doctrine, the distinction between 
intending and foreseeing is morally irrelevant. Savulescu holds, “A parent who 
intentionally inflicted deafness on his or her child, or failed to treat it, would be 
abusing the child. . . . There is no difference morally speaking between causing a 
harm and deliberately and avoidably allowing it to occur.”8 On this view, there is also 
therefore no moral difference between intentionally causing people to die in poverty 
by destroying their food, and omitting to give money that could have prevented them 
from dying in poverty,9 which is precisely what takes place when the $12,500 to 
$16,000 per cycle is used for PB rather than for poverty relief.
This denial of the ethical difference between intending and foreseeing some 
effect from one’s action causes further problems for situating PB with respect to 
ethical and legal duties. Savulescu holds that PB is only a moral duty, and not a legal 
duty. Procreative autonomy, on his view, is subject to moral but not legal proscription. 
However, what moral grounds then would there be for child abuse laws that prohibit, 
for example, intentionally destroying the capacity for hearing or sight in a child but 
not criminalizing the act of allowing a child to be deaf or blind? If intentionally doing 
and deliberately allowing are equivalent, then allowing and intentionally causing a 
child to be deaf should both be illegal or allowing and intentionally causing a child
7 Dena Davis, “The Parental Investment Factor and the Child’s Right to an Open 
Future,” Hastings Center Report 39.2 (March-April 2009): 26.
Julian Savulescu, “In Defence of Procreative Beneficence,” Journal o f  Medical Ethics 
33.5 (May 2007): 284-288.
9 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in What’s Wrong?AppliedEthicists 
and Their Critics, ed. David Boonin and Graham Oddie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005).
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to be deaf should both be legal. Decrim inalizing the act o f  intentionally depriving 
a child o f hearing or sight is absurd, but crim inalizing the act o f allowing a child to 
be born without hearing contradicts Savulescu’s view o f procreative autonomy.
Finally, in using the money for famine relief in lieu o f procreative beneficence, 
the money is much more effectively spent to make the world a better place. Resources 
spent on IVF and PGD usually do not bring about the desired benefit, since more 
than 60 percent o f the time IVF fails to lead to live birth. By contrast, supplying 
clean water, mosquito nets, and healthy food is virtually guaranteed to promote the 
well-being o f those who need them. Thus, i f  we have a duty to m axim ize expected 
well-being, we have a duty not to use IVF and PGD— at least as long as conditions 
o f famine and poverty exist anywhere in the world.
Rebecca Bennett criticizes PB from a different perspective (“The Fallacy o f 
the Principle o f Procreative Beneficence,” Bioethics, June 2009). She argues that PB 
implicitly denies the fundamental hum an equality o f all hum an beings, including 
those with disabilities such as deafness or blindness:
Any argument that a world without disabilities is not only preferable for many 
people, but is morally preferable, a morally better world, unavoidably rests on 
the assumption that a life with even moderate disabilities or impairments is a 
life with less moral value than other lives. We can understand that it is better 
for a particular person to have as good a quality of life as possible but if we 
insist that a world without impaired people is morally preferable to a world 
containing impaired people, even though we admit that no one is harmed by 
being born in an impaired state, then we do so because we value the impaired 
less than the unimpaired. If the values placed on particular lives do not simply 
reflect many people’s preferences but something of moral significance, then 
they must place a lower moral value on those lives impaired by a lower quality 
of life, whether this lower quality of life is as a result of disability, poverty, 
racial origins, aesthetic features, gender, etc.
Bennett argues that choosing the genetically superior embryos is not a moral issue 
but an issue o f personal preference, so that if  someone were to prefer to have a blind 
child, it would be morally permissible.
Advocates for PB insist that the principle differs from eugenics because the focus 
is on producing the best child a couple could have, which is a private matter, rather 
than on producing the best society; however, Bennett challenges this assertion:
As we have seen, the establishment of a moral obligation to bring to birth the 
best child we can is not built on the private interests of the prospective parents 
regarding what sort of child they wish to have, or on the individual interests 
of the child who will be created, as their welfare will not be affected by the 
decision about which embryo to implant or which pregnancy to continue.
What this obligation is built on is an idea of making the world a better place 
than it could otherwise have been, not in terms of any individual person’s 
welfare, but in terms of creating the greatest total score for what is regarded 
as the goods of life. If a project is not interested in the welfare of particular 
people but in creating what those proposing this project believe is the best 
world possible, then this is exactly what eugenics is—promoting social and 
not personal goods.
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Bennett concludes by arguing that what matters morally is maximizing the welfare 
of actual people, rather than choosing among what she considers to be “potential” 
people on the basis of what their lives might be if they were chosen. But if this is 
true, then as long as poverty exists in the world, PB is ethically impermissible.
In his article “The Illiberality of Perfectionist Enhancement,” Teun Dekker 
suggests that liberalism and many eugenic enhancements are irreconcilable (Medi­
cine, Health Care, and Philosophy, February 2009). The liberal view, as described 
by Dekker, is that we may not impose our own conception of the good onto another 
person without that person’s permission. This moral requirement binds governments 
as well as individuals, and leads to liberal permissiveness in terms of legalizing drug 
use, same-sex marriage, physician-assisted suicide, and prostitution. However, insofar 
as procreative beneficence aims at enhancing any particular aptitude in a child—for 
instance, musical or athletic ability—such eugenics is illiberal, for by means of it 
the parents force their conception of a good life—for instance, a life of musical or 
athletic performance—onto the child without the child’s consent.
Dekker takes an extreme example to make his case against what he calls 
“perfectionist enhancement.” Imagine parents who believe that castrato opera is the 
highest form of human expression, and so decide to genetically engineer their son to 
have no testicles, so that he can hit the high notes even in adulthood. Imagine that 
the child decides as an adult that he deeply desires to marry and become a biological 
father. In this case, the parents have damaged the child’s well-being and undermined 
his autonomy. Dekker’s case against genetic enhancements echoes thoughts earlier 
articulated by C.S. Lewis, who wrote that by means of “selective breeding, [future 
generations] are, without their concurring voice, made to be what one generation, for 
its own reasons, may choose to prefer. From this point of view, what we call Man’s 
power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men 
with Nature as its instrument.”10
Dekker allows and indeed requires what he calls “natural primary goods 
enhancement,” augmentations that enhance well-being in any path in life, rather 
than well-being in one particular path of life chosen by the parents and imposed on 
the children. What exactly is the distinction between perfectionist enhancement and 
natural goods enhancement? Dekker explains:
If natural primary goods are genetic traits that are useful for any plan of life, 
the inverse correlate might be termed perfectionist natural goods. These 
are traits that are only useful for certain plans of life, and may very well be 
detrimental to many others. They might include musical ability and specific 
types of athletic prowess. All genetic traits that are useful for some plans 
of life but not for others are included in this category. Hence the distinction 
between natural primary goods enhancement and perfectionist enhancement 
is a very clear one; if we can imagine a plan of life for which the proposed 
enhancement is not useful, it is not a natural primary good.
But is there an authentic distinction between natural primary goods and perfectionist 
enhancement so described? Savulescu and Kahane express doubt. “What makes it
10 C. S. Lewis, The Abolition o f Man (New York: MacMillan, 1955): 68-69.
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harder to lead a good life in one circumstance may make it easier in another. The 
atopic tendency which leads to asthma in the developed world protects against worm 
infestations in the undeveloped world. Deafness would be a positive advantage in 
an environment of extremely loud and distracting noise.” Although characteristi­
cally quite useful, greater memory, impulse control, humor, and patience can also 
place a person at a disadvantage in certain circumstances (T. F. Murphy, “Choosing 
Disabilities and Enhancements in Children: A Choice Too Far?” Reproductive Bio­
Medicine Online, supplement 1, March 2009). Even intelligence and education, so 
beneficial in so many situations, can put a person at a disadvantage in some contexts. 
Consider a highbrow professor making small talk with uncultivated relatives who 
communicate almost exclusively in pop-culture banalities and material fallacies. If 
the professor were less intelligent and educated, this familial social context would 
be comfortable and perhaps even invigorating, but it is, in fact, just the opposite. 
Natural goods enhancement turns out not to be different in kind from perfectionist 
enhancement. Both are illiberal.
Is choosing a child on the basis of genetic endowment intrinsically evil? Imagine 
parents at an orphanage who have their choice of available newborns. Would it be 
ethically wrong for them to choose one baby over others because they believe that 
the baby has a superior genetic endowment? I cannot see how it would be. But notice 
how this differs from the reality of PB. In the orphanage, the parents do not choose 
among their own biological children, nor do they consign the children they do not 
choose to death.
Imagine, however, that children conceived on even days had better genetic 
characteristics than children conceived on odd days. Would it be wrong to choose to 
make love on even days so as to maximize the chances of the child having a better 
genetic endowment? Again, I cannot see why it would. If PB did not presuppose using 
abortion or using IVF and PGD, if IVF did not increase the likelihood of disability, 
if the fundamental principle giving rise to PB were consistently applied such that 
only a married couple could legitimately procreate, if the vast sums of money used 
for PB to possibly benefit one or two people were not desperately needed elsewhere 
to help many people, then, in my opinion, maximizing the genetic well-being of a 
child carried out by morally legitimate means would be acceptable.
Christopher Kaczor, Ph .D.
Loyola Marymount University 
Los Angeles, California
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